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Smart mobile devices are playing a more and more important role in our daily life. Cancelable biometrics is a promising mechanism
to provide authentication to mobile devices and protect biometric templates by applying a noninvertible transformation to raw
biometric data. However, the negative effect of nonlinear distortion will usually degrade the matching performance significantly,
which is a nontrivial factor when designing a cancelable template. Moreover, the attacks via record multiplicity (ARM) present a
threat to the existing cancelable biometrics, which is still a challenging open issue. To address these problems, in this paper, we
propose a new cancelable fingerprint template which can not only mitigate the negative effect of nonlinear distortion by combining
multiple feature sets, but also defeat the ARM attack through a proposed feature decorrelation algorithm. Our work is a new
contribution to the design of cancelable biometrics with a concrete method against the ARM attack. Experimental results on public
databases and security analysis show the validity of the proposed cancelable template.

1. Introduction
Nowadays, mobile devices, e.g., smartphone, have become
one of our daily necessities. They are used to store personal
data and handle private communication. Unfortunately, there
are some privacy and security issues along with the use of
smartphones; for example, a user’s private data, e.g., photo,
contacts, and bank details, can be compromised, if his/her
smartphone without any protection is stolen or lost. Secret
knowledge-based approaches, e.g., password or PIN, are
commonly used for authentication. However, these methods
rely heavily on the user to ensure continued validity, and poor
use of password or PIN may lead to great security breaches [1].
Fingerprint recognition has been extensively used in
various applications, e.g., authentication on mobile devices.
With good recognition accuracy and high convenience,
fingerprint-based authentication systems hold more markets
than other biometrics, e.g., face, iris, and voice. Fingerprint
authentication is usually composed of two stages, the enrollment stage and the verification stage [2]. In the enrollment

stage, feature data extracted from a captured fingerprint
image are considered as a template, which is stored in a
database. In the verification stage, the query feature data,
extracted in the same way as template feature data, are
compared with the stored template, and a match or nonmatch
verdict will be made.
The use of fingerprint authentication systems eliminates the need of remembering long passwords or PIN,
which is the disadvantages of traditional password- or PINbased authentication schemes. However, fingerprint-based
biometric systems have one main drawback; that is, once a
fingerprint is compromised, it will be lost forever. To address
this issue, cancelable fingerprint templates [3], among other
biometric template protection schemes, have been proposed.
Instead of storing raw fingerprint data as a template, it is
distorted through a one-way transformation function in the
enrollment stage. Such a transformation is intentional and
repeatable. One important property of cancelable fingerprint
templates is noninvertibility, which means that it should be
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computationally hard to recover the raw fingerprint data from
the transformed fingerprint template [4]. In the verification
stage, the same transformation is applied to the query data.
Matching between the transformed template and query is
conducted in the transformed domain. In this way, if the
stored template is compromised, a new version of it can be
generated by changing the transformation parameter(s) [5].
1.1. Related Work
1.1.1. Mobile Biometrics. A lot research effort has been
devoted to the design of more precise, usable, and secure
biometric authentication schemes on mobile devices. For
instance, in [16], Clarke and Furnell introduced a method
for authenticating users by getting them to input telephone
numbers or write text messages. This method is called
biometric keystroke analysis. In [17], Kim and Hong proposed
to use teeth together with voice to authenticate users, which is
the first research work using the teeth and voice combination.
The matching scores of each individual trait are calculated
and fused using a weighted-summation operation. The experiments are conducted by using a dataset that contains one
thousand teeth images and voices collected by smartphones.
Later they proposed an enhanced multimodal authentication
system [18], which adds another biometric trait, face, on top
of teeth and voice to achieve better results.
In [19], Lee et al. designed a mobile multimodal biometric
system based on finger-vein and fingerprint. The proposed
system can obtain fingerprint and finger-vein images simultaneously and also is able to overcome some limitations
of unimodal biometric systems, e.g., lack of accuracy. In
[20], Tao and Veldhuis developed a face-based biometric
authentication system on mobile devices, which contained
detailed information about the process, including face detection, registration, illumination normalization, verification,
and information fusion.
In [21], Chen et al. proposed a fingerprint-based
remote authentication method using mobile devices. In their
method, both fingerprint and password are involved to
improve the security level of the system. Moreover, hashing
functions are used to implement mutual authentication. In
[22], a palmprint-based recognition system is proposed for
mobile devices. Specifically, a hand-shaped guide window
is introduced for fast image acquisition and an enhanced
competitive code is used to cope with image variation.
In [23], Rattani et al. investigated gender prediction from
ocular images acquired by smartphones so as to enhance
the accuracy of the integrated biometric authentication and
mobile healthcare system. In [24], Marsico et al. compared
the performance of several participant methods in the Mobile
Iris Challenge Evaluation-1 contest. Furthermore, some analysis is given to image covariate and interoperability.
Several survey papers, e.g., [25, 26], discussed the biometric authentication methods on mobile devices, including
current development, trends, and challenges. The significance
of template protection on mobile devices is described in [26].
However, we notice that most of above-mentioned biometric
authentication methods do not protect the biometric template on mobile devices, which potentially put important
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personal information at risk. With good recognition accuracy
and high convenience offered by fingerprint, in this paper,
we propose a fingerprint-based authentication system using
the cancelable technique to provide template protection on
mobile devices.
1.1.2. Cancelable Biometrics. The concept of cancelable biometrics was initiated by Ratha et al. in [27]. Later, they
constructed a practical cancelable fingerprint authentication
system [4] by using three different transformation functions,
namely, Cartesian transformation, polar transformation, and
functional transformation. The transformation functions are
able to distort the fingerprint minutiae feature into a new data
format. This method is registration-based and hence relies
on precise detection of the reference points, e.g., singular,
core, or delta points. However, fingerprint uncertainty caused
by displacement, nonlinear distortion, and rotation during
the process of fingerprint capturing is unavoidable, thus
making accurate registration hard to achieve. A matching error can possibly be caused by a registration error
[28].
To relinquish the process of global registration and
also reduce the impact of nonlinear distortion [29, 30],
registration-free local structure based methods have been
proposed; see, e.g., [5–11, 13, 14, 31–40]. In [5], Yang et al.
proposed a cancelable template design based on geometric
transformation. Each local Delaunay triangle-based structure
instead of each single minutia acts as a unit to be transformed
under the guidance of two transformation matrices. In [31],
Farooq et al. presented a cancelable fingerprint template
based on a set of triangles derived from any three minutiae.
The features extracted from the set of triangles are further
converted into the binary format. Then this binary string was
randomly permuted into a different feature representation
under the conduct of a user specific key. The cancelability
of the feature representation can be achieved by applying
different keys. Lee et al. [32] proposed an approach to
calculating a rotation- and translation-invariant value from
the orientation information of neighboring local regions
around each minutia. The invariant value is then utilized
as the input of two transformation functions to generate
transformed features. The cancelable template is governed
by these two transformation functions. In [33], in order to
avoid global alignment, the authors used localized matching,
which consists of matching minutia triplets constructed by
each minutia and its two nearest neighbors. Invariant features
extracted from these triplets are varied and secured by
the symmetric hash functions. A major drawback of this
approach is the assumption that the genuine query sample
minutiae, being described as locations in a complex plane,
are linearly transformed from the template minutia set.
However, the most challenging issue for fingerprint minutiabased matching is the nonlinear elastic distortion of minutia
locations. Therefore, this assumption is not realistic. Ahn
et al. [6] applied geometrical properties, e.g., local relation,
from minutiae triplets to hiding the minutiae information.
Generation of these geometrical features is conducted via a
transformation function in an attempt to keep the discriminating capability.
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In [7], Yang et al. introduced the geometrically aligned
and protected minutia vicinity for template protection. The
proposed method transforms the original minutia vicinity
by adding some parameter guided offsets into each minutiae
group so as to destroy the original local topological relationship among those minutiae. The original minutia vicinity is
defined by a minutia together with its 𝑀 closest neighboring
minutiae. In [34], minutia pairs applying redundant combinations of two minutiae points are formed to counter some
image noise. A bit-string cancelable template is derived from
the minutia pairs. Similarly to [31], the same user specific
tokens are used to guarantee that the bit-string features are
permuted in the same manner during both enrollment and
verification stages. A different local structure represented by a
3D array was proposed in [35]. In this structure, each minutia
is chosen as the reference point and other minutiae are rotated
and translated based on the orientation and position of the
reference point so as to map the minutiae into the 3D array.
Each minutia after transformation falls into a specific cell of
the 3D array and each cell is marked as 1 if more than one
minutia locates in it; otherwise it is marked as 0. A resultant
bit-string is then permuted by using a user specific PIN.
Yang et al. [8] proposed to use a dynamic random projection
method to protect the biometric features extracted from local
structures composed of a reference minutia and three closest
minutiae around it. Although this method can dynamically
choose a projection matrix from a set of candidate projection
matrices, it is a primitive direct biometric key generation
technique, which has poor error tolerance for low quality
fingerprint images.
Ahmad et al. [9] built a pair-polar coordinate-based
alignment-free structure. The pair-polar structure uses the
relative position of each minutia to other minutiae in a
polar coordinate space. Three local features are extracted
from any two minutiae and then a functional transformation
is applied to these local features to achieve the resultant
cancelable template. In [36], a circular region is constructed
around each minutia and the circular region can be divided
into different levels according to different radiuses. Then
the circular regions are encrypted by two transformation
functions and stored as the cancelable template. In [37],
Jin et al. generated a revocable fingerprint template via a
polar grid-based method. For each reference minutia, the
polar transform is performed first to align the remaining
minutiae. After that, a 3-tuple quantization technique is
utilized to generate the local feature in the form of a bit-string.
The user specific token based permutation technique is also
utilized for feature transformation. Das et al. [38] proposed
to use the minimum distance graphs, which involve a set
of interminutia minimum distance vectors starting from the
core point, as rotation- and translation-invariant features to
conduct hash transformation so as to protect the original
template.
In contrast to the pair-polar based structure proposed
in [9], Wang and Hu [10–12, 41] mainly considered the
noninvertible transformation functions. In [10], a densely
infinite-to-one mapping method is presented to accomplish
the transformation; in [11], a curtailed circular convolution
is used to achieve noninvertible transformation; in [41],
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the identifiability condition in blind channel estimation is
deliberately violated to protect the source input—the binary
string’s frequency samples; and, in [12], the binary biometric representations are securely protected by the partial
Hadamard transformation, which transforms them into complex vectors. In [39], Wong et al. designed a multiline code for
generating the cancelable fingerprint template. The multiline
code is a string-based minutia descriptor extracted from a
set of minutiae surrounding a virtual line within a specified
range. Then a user specific secret key guided permutation is
performed to achieve feature transformation. In [13], Jin et al.
developed a two-dimensional random projection technique
to secure the minutiae-based fingerprint template generated
from minutia vicinities. Each minutia vicinity is formed
by a minutia and three nearest minutiae around it. The
feature matrix generated from a set of minutia vicinities is
transformed/mapped onto a random subspace determined by
an external orthogonal random matrix, which is generated
by a user specific token. In [14], Jin et al. adopted the same
local structure as [13] but incorporated a different noninvertible transformation method named randomized graph-based
hamming embedding (RGHE) to protect the original features. In [40], Zhang et al. presented two methods, which are
a designed combo plate and a functional transformation, to
produce cancelable templates based on the MCC code, which
associates a local structure to each minutia [42]. Note that the
method named P-MCC in [42] is not a cancelable template as
it does not provide the property of revocability. Subsequently,
a partial permutation based scheme named 2P-MCC [15]
was proposed to add revocability to P-MCC. However, 2PMCC suffers from the ARM. P-MCC is not revocable, which
̂ that contains 𝑘 binary values
means that the feature vector 𝑉
in P-MCC remains unchanged in different applications. The
2P-MCC scheme uses a user specific key 𝑠 as the index
and chooses 𝑐 (0 < 𝑐 ≤ 𝑘) binary values from those 𝑘
̂ to create a new feature vector 𝑉.̈ When
binary values of 𝑉
unlinkability is required, at least one element of the 𝑐 binary
values from any two templates, e.g., 𝑉,̈ should be different.
By combining templates from at most (k-c+1) applications,
̂
̂
the feature vector 𝑉can
be restored. Once feature vector 𝑉
̂ being the same in
is obtained by the adversary and due to 𝑉
different applications, the adversary can verify the correctness
of the inverted feature generated from template 𝑉̈ and the
̂
user specific key s by comparing it with 𝑉.
In [43], Kaur and Khanna presented a cancelable biometric method, named random slop, which can reduce the feature
dimensions by up to 75%. This method has been tested on
many biometric databases, such as face, palmprint, palmvein,
and fingervein, except fingerprint, although it can be implemented to fingerprint features. In order to further enhance
recognition accuracy and security of cancelable unibiometric
systems, in [44], Paul et al. developed a cancelable biometric
template creation algorithm using random biometric feature
fusion, random projection, and selection based on face and
ear. In [45], Yang et al. proposed a fingerprint and fingervein based cancelable multibiometric system, in which a
feature-level fusion strategy with three fusion options are
designed. In the meantime, an enhanced partial discrete
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Figure 1: A polar space centering around minutia 𝑚0 .

Fourier transform based noninvertible transformation is
applied.
1.2. Motivation and Contributions. From the above-mentioned cancelable fingerprint template systems, it is observed
that the rotation- and transformation-invariant local region
based structures are employed and the main difference
between these local structures is the region size. For example,
small-sized local structures are used in [6–8, 13, 14, 33]. In
these systems, the local structures are only composed of
one reference minutia and two or three of its neighboring
minutiae. Small-sized structures can resist nonlinear distortion to some extent. However, since these local structures
only contain a moderate number of minutiae, the feature
data extracted from them are not discriminative enough. By
contrast, relatively large local structures are employed in [9–
11, 31, 34, 35, 37–40]. Large-sized structures consist of more
minutiae and tend to include relatively more information
that can be exploited for matching. However, the positional
change of minutiae for large-sized structures is likely to
occur under nonlinear distortion, especially when minutiae
are located far away from the reference point. Because of
nonlinear distortion, for example, minutiae 𝑚1 , 𝑚2 , and 𝑚3 in
the template image and their corresponding minutiae 𝑚1 , 𝑚2 ,
and 𝑚3 in the query image are possibly located in different
cells in a polar coordinate system, as shown in Figure 1. To
strike a balance and achieve good matching performance,
some authors [32, 36] proposed to use parameters to control
the region size. However, testing different parameter settings
in a practical authentication process would create additional
computational load and resource burden or even be infeasible.
Another issue that troubles the existing cancelable template systems is the security concern. The methods in

[5, 31, 34, 35, 37, 39] use permutation matrices for feature
transformation. Since the permutation functions are invertible [10], original fingerprint features are not secured safely
if the permutation matrices are compromised. Although the
methods in [7, 9–15, 40, 41] that use the noninvertible manyto-one mapping strategy can avoid the above issue, they suffer
from the attacks via record multiplicity (ARM) [46, 47],
if multiple transformed templates and their corresponding
transformation parameters are acquired by an adversary.
Readers can refer to [46, 47] for more details about the ARM.
To address the above issues, in this paper, we propose a
new cancelable fingerprint template system. Not only can the
proposed system reduce the impact of nonlinear distortion on
those minutiae that are located far away from the reference
point, but it also can defend the system against the ARM
attack. In particular, the new cancelable fingerprint template
system processes both local and global structures and fuses
two different schemes at the score level, so that the overall
system achieves better recognition accuracy than a single
scheme only. The overall processing flow of the proposed
system is shown in Figure 2. Specifically, in the enrollment
stage, two feature sets, the polar coordinate-based feature
set (T1) and the Delaunay triangulation-based feature set
(T2), are extracted from the polar coordinate-based local
structure and Delaunay triangulation-based global structure,
respectively. Next, feature set T1 is processed by the proposed feature decorrelation algorithm and then varied by
a random projection transformation function. Feature set
T2 is permutated under the guidance of the feature codes.
Both transformed feature sets, T1 and T2, are stored in the
database. In the verification stage, the same transformations
used in the enrollment stage are applied to the query feature
sets, Q1 and Q2. Matching between the transformed template
and query feature sets is conducted in the transformed
domain.
The main contributions of this paper are highlighted as
follows.
(1) Two schemes, polar coordinate-based scheme and
Delaunay triangulation-based scheme, are utilized and fused
on the score level. Specifically, the polar coordinate-based
scheme uses the feature set from the polar coordinate space
and acts as our basic scheme, which can provide reasonable
feature discrimination. The Delaunay triangulation-based
scheme that uses the feature set from Delaunay triangulation
serves as a complement to the basic scheme. It can effectively
reduce the negative impact of nonlinear distortion on the
minutiae that are located far away from the reference minutia.
As a result, compared with the system that only uses the
polar coordinate-based scheme, higher recognition accuracy
is achieved.
(2) A main reason that cancelable biometrics suffer the
ARM attack is due to feature correlation which exists among
cancelable templates stored across multiple applications but
actually derived from the same biometric features. To address
the issue, we propose a feature decorrelation algorithm so
that the feature vectors, which are generated from the same
feature set, are uncorrelated in different applications. Without
feature correlation, the adversary would not have adequate
information to determine the original feature data.
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polar coordinatebased structure
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Figure 2: The overall processing flow of the proposed system (Features T1, T2, Q1, and Q2 represent the feature sets from the polar coordinatebased structure and Delaunay triangulation-based structure of the template image and query image, respectively).

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, two feature sets, polar coordinate-based feature set
and Delaunay triangle-based feature set, are introduced.
The proposed cancelable fingerprint authentication system,
which can defeat the ARM attack, is presented in Section 3.
In Section 4, experimental results and security analysis are
demonstrated and discussed. The conclusion is given in
Section 5.

2. Generation of Two Feature Sets
In this section, we introduce two feature sets that are
extracted from the polar coordinate-based and Delaunay
triangulation-based structures, respectively. These two structures are derived from the same minutiae set of a fingerprint
image. Each polar coordinate-based structure is composed of
a reference minutia and other minutiae in a predefined range.
The use of the polar coordinate system allows the relationships between the reference minutia and other minutiae to be
readily defined and measured. The Delaunay triangulationbased structure formed by a set of minutiae is a triangulation
where no minutia in that set of minutiae is inside the
circumcircle of any triangle in the triangulation. Specifically,
given a set of minutiae 𝑀 = (𝑚0 , 𝑚1 , 𝑚2 , . . . , 𝑚𝑁−1 ),
where 𝑁 is the number of minutiae, each minutia 𝑚𝑖∈[0,𝑁−1]
can be represented by a vector (𝑥𝑖 , 𝑦𝑖 , 𝜃𝑖 , 𝑡𝑖 ), where 𝑥𝑖 and
𝑦𝑖 are the 𝑥, 𝑦 coordinates in the Cartesian coordinate
system, 𝜃𝑖 is the orientation in the range of [0, 2𝜋), and
𝑡𝑖 is the minutia type. For each fingerprint image, the
following two feature sets are generated from the above two
structures.

2.1. Polar Coordinate-Based Feature Set. In the polar coordinate-based structure, if the minutia, e.g., 𝑚0 , is considered as
the origin of the polar coordinate and the remaining minutiae
in range of 𝑅 (=300 pixels) are rotated and translated with
respect to 𝑚0 such that the orientation of 𝑚0 equals 0 degree
in the polar coordinate system, then any minutia 𝑚𝑖∈[1,𝑁−1]
can be converted and expressed as a triplet (𝜌𝑖 , 𝛼𝑖 , 𝛽𝑖 ), where
0 < 𝜌𝑖 ≤ 300 is the radial distance, 0 < 𝛼𝑖 ≤ 2𝜋 is the radial
angle, and 0 < 𝛽𝑖 ≤ 2𝜋 is the relative orientation of minutia
𝑚𝑖 to 𝑚0 . An example of the polar space centered around
minutia 𝑚0 is shown in Figure 1. In order to tolerate small
distortion, polar grid-based quantization [35] is performed
on all the minutiae in the range of 𝑅. We assume that the
step sizes of 𝜌𝑖 , 𝛼𝑖 , and 𝛽𝑖 are 𝑠𝜌 , 𝑠𝛼 , and 𝑠𝛽 , respectively
(5 ≤ 𝑠𝜌 ≤ 20 and 𝜋/12 ≤ 𝑠𝛼 , 𝑠𝛽 ≤ 2𝜋/9). Then the
polar space centered around 𝑚0 can be quantized into a
3D cube containing 𝑙𝐶 = 𝐿 × 𝑆 × 𝐻 cells, where 𝐿 =
⌊𝑅/𝑠𝜌 ⌋, 𝑆 = ⌊2𝜋/𝑠𝛼 ⌋, and 𝐻 = ⌊2𝜋/𝑠𝛽 ⌋. The cell where the
𝑞 𝑞 𝑞
minutia 𝑚𝑖 is located in the 3D cube is (𝜌𝑖 , 𝛼𝑖 , 𝛽𝑖 ), where
𝑞
𝑞
𝑞
𝜌𝑖 = ⌊𝜌𝑖 /𝑠𝛽 ⌋, 𝛼𝑖 = ⌊𝛼𝑖 /𝑠𝛼 ⌋, and 𝛽𝑖 = ⌊𝛽𝑖 /𝑠𝛽 ⌋. By this
means, we obtain a vector 𝑃(𝑚0 ) of length 𝑙𝐶 containing
only ‘0’s and ‘1’s, in which ‘1’ means the appearance of one
or more minutiae in the corresponding cell. 𝑙𝐶 varies under
different parameter settings of 𝑠𝜌 , 𝑠𝛼 , and 𝑠𝛽 . It is obvious
that when these parameter settings change, the value of 𝑙𝐶
changes accordingly. In our application, different parameter
settings are chosen for different databases in order to achieve
best performance. Within the value range of these parameter
settings, the largest value of 𝑙𝐶 that can be obtained is 34560.
Therefore, we use a fixed value of 𝑙𝐶 = 34560 for all the chosen
databases and pad ‘0’ to those feature vectors with elements
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(a)

(b)

Figure 3: An example of (a) Voronoi diagram, (b) Delaunay triangulation (bold line).

less than 34560. By applying the above approach to every
minutia in the set of minutiae 𝑀 = (𝑚0 , 𝑚1 , 𝑚2 , . . . , 𝑚𝑁−1 ),
a polar coordinate-based feature set 𝐶 = {𝑃(𝑚𝑖 )}𝑁−1
𝑖=0 is
generated.
2.2. Delaunay Triangulation-Based Feature Set. As a complement to the polar coordinate-based feature set, we propose
the second feature set, which is extracted from the Delaunay
triangulation-based structure and takes advantage of the
desirable features [48–50] of Delaunay triangulation. In the
presence of nonlinear distortion, Delaunay triangulation has
a stable local neighborhood structure. Minutiae will keep
the same neighboring structure if the nonlinear distortion
does not move minutiae out of the tolerance region. Also,
noise in fingerprint images influences the Delaunay triangulation only locally. Spurious or missing minutiae affect only
those local Delaunay structures which contain them. A brief
description about the generation of a Delaunay triangulation
is given below; readers can refer to [51] for more details.
For the set of minutiae 𝑀 = (𝑚0 , 𝑚1 , 𝑚2 , . . . , 𝑚𝑁−1 ),
a Voronoi tessellation, which divides the whole fingerprint
image region into several smaller regions centering on each
minutia, is created first as shown in Figure 3(a). All the
points in the region around 𝑚𝑖 are closer to 𝑚𝑖 than to any
other minutia. The Delaunay triangulation is generated by
connecting the centers of every neighboring region as shown
in Figure 3(b).
Assume that there are 𝑁1 Delaunay triangles generated
from 𝑁 minutiae; several invariant features can be defined
from each Delaunay triangle. Taking triangle Δ𝑚1 𝑚2 𝑚3 as an
example, four rotation- and translation-invariant features are
defined as follows:
(i) 𝑜𝑚1 𝑚2 is the orientation differences between 𝑚1 and
𝑚2 .
(ii) 𝑙𝑚2 𝑚3 is the length of edge 𝑚2 𝑚3 .

(iii) 𝛼𝑚3 is the angle between edge 𝑚1 𝑚3 and 𝑚2 𝑚3 .
(iv) 𝑡𝑚1 𝑚2 𝑚3 is the concatenation of minutia type of 𝑚1 ,
𝑚2 , and 𝑚3 .
0 < 𝑜𝑚1 𝑚2 ≤ 2𝜋, 0 < 𝑙𝑚2 𝑚3 ≤ 300, and 0 < 𝛼𝑚3 ≤ 2𝜋. A
feature data set, e.g., 𝑓𝑚1 𝑚2 𝑚3 = (𝑜𝑚1 𝑚2 , 𝑙𝑚2 𝑚3 , 𝛼𝑚3 , 𝑡𝑚1 𝑚2 𝑚3 ),
can be extracted from each Delaunay triangle. To tolerate
the variation caused by nonlinear distortion that is inherent
in fingerprint images, quantization is applied to each feature
set. The quantization step sizes are set to be 𝑠𝑜 , 𝑠𝑙 , and 𝑠𝛼 for
𝑜𝑚1 𝑚2 , 𝑙𝑚2 𝑚3 , and 𝛼𝑚3 , respectively (15 ≤ 𝑠𝑙 ≤ 25, 𝜋/12 ≤
𝑠𝑜 , 𝑠𝛼 ≤ 𝜋/9). Each element of 𝑓𝑚1 𝑚2 𝑚3 , after quantization, can
𝑞
𝑞
𝑞
𝑞
𝑞
, 𝑙𝑚
, 𝛼𝑚
, and 𝑡𝑚1 𝑚2 𝑚3 . If 𝑜𝑚
, 𝑙𝑚
,
be expressed as 𝑜𝑚
1 𝑚2
2 𝑚3
3
1 𝑚2
2 𝑚3
𝑞
𝛼𝑚3 , and 𝑡𝑚1 𝑚2 𝑚3 are represented by 𝑎1 , 𝑎2 , 𝑎3 , and 𝑎4 bits,
respectively, then the triangle Δ𝑚1 𝑚2 𝑚3 can be represented
by a bit-string 𝑓𝑚𝑞 1 𝑚2 𝑚3 by putting them in sequence together.
The integer value of this bit-string falls in the range of [0, 𝑙𝐷 −
1], where 𝑙𝐷 = 2𝑎1 +𝑎2 +𝑎3 +𝑎4 . With 𝑁1 Delaunay triangles
constructed from a given fingerprint image, each of them
should match a value in [0, 𝑙𝐷 − 1] and so the corresponding
bin is indexed by 1, as shown in [34]. As a result, the Delaunay
triangulation-based feature set can be represented by a binary
vector 𝐷 of length 𝑙𝐷.
We now explain why we add the second feature set. In
the Delaunay triangulation-based feature set, each Delaunay
triangle rather than each minutia is treated as a feature unit
because a Delaunay triangle is more robust against nonlinear
distortion than each individual minutia. For example, as
mentioned in Section 1, minutiae 𝑚1 , 𝑚2 , and 𝑚3 in the
template image may not seem to match their corresponding
minutiae 𝑚1 , 𝑚2 , and 𝑚3 in the query image in a polar
coordinate system since they fall in different cells due to
nonlinear distortion, as shown in Figure 1. However, if we
consider the triangle Δ𝑚1 𝑚2 𝑚3 constituted by minutiae 𝑚1 ,
𝑚2 , and 𝑚3 as a unit, no matter where Δ𝑚1 𝑚2 𝑚3 is moved,
features such as the edge length and angle, extracted from it,

Wireless Communications and Mobile Computing

m m
m

m

7

INPUT: the original feature 𝑃(𝑚𝑖 )
Process:
Step 1: Each position 𝑉𝑝 of value 1 that is located in
the binary string 𝑃(𝑚𝑖 ), is input into a folding
function 𝑓𝑃 = mod(𝑉𝑝 , 𝐿 𝐶), where 𝐿 𝐶 is an
application-specific parameter and set to be smaller
than 𝑙𝐶 . mod(⋅) is a modulo operation, for example,
mod(7,5) = 2 and mod(12,5) = 2.
Step 2: With each value of 1 in 𝑃(𝑚𝑖 ) relocated to a
new position depending on 𝑓𝑃 , a new binary string
P(𝑚𝑖 ) of length 𝐿 𝐶 is generated.
Step 3: P(𝑚𝑖 ) is converted into a real-value vector
through the Discrete Fourier Transform (DFT) as
P(𝑚𝑖 ) = 𝐷𝐹𝑇(P(𝑚𝑖 )).
OUTPUT: decorrelated feature P(𝑚𝑖 )
Algorithm 1: Feature decorrelation algorithm.

Figure 4: Delaunay triangulation-based structure centering around
𝑚0 .

still remain invariant. Thus, using these features, Δ𝑚1 𝑚2 𝑚3
and Δ𝑚1 𝑚2 𝑚3 can match each other.

3. Design of the Cancelable Fingerprint
Authentication System
In this section, we present the two general stages included
in the proposed cancelable fingerprint authentication
system.
3.1. Enrollment Stage. In the enrollment stage, the original
feature sets are transformed. The detail of the enrollment
stage is explained below.
Given a template image 𝐹𝑇 (letter 𝑇 means template),
the untransformed feature sets 𝐶𝑇 and 𝐷𝑇 as introduced in
Section 2 can be extracted from the polar coordinate-based
and Delaunay triangulation-based structures as shown in
Figure 4. However, feature sets 𝐶𝑇 and 𝐷𝑇 are vulnerable.
Because if the adversary acquires the vector 𝐶𝑇 , he/she would
be able to know the minutiae’s location in the 3D cube.
Subsequently the feature triplet (𝜌, 𝛼, 𝛽) of each minutia
can be recovered. Similarly, it is not difficult to reveal the
original minutiae information from 𝐷𝑇 . Hence, it is crucial to
protect the feature sets 𝐶𝑇 and 𝐷𝑇 . To achieve this, the polar
coordinate-based scheme and the Delaunay triangulationbased scheme are utilized to protect each element of 𝐶𝑇 and
𝐷𝑇 , respectively.
3.1.1. The Polar Coordinate-Based Scheme. In the polar coordinate-based scheme, the feature set is processed by a
feature decorrelation algorithm and then varied by a random
projection matrix M generated under the participation of a
user specific key 𝑘𝑝𝑚 . The loss of key 𝑘𝑝𝑚 means the loss of the
projection matrix M. The feature decorrelation algorithm can

eliminate feature correlation in different applications, thus
making it robust against the ARM attack.
For an element, e.g., 𝑃(𝑚0 ), of the feature set 𝐶𝑇 =
𝑁𝑇 −1
{𝑃(𝑚𝑖 )}𝑖=0
, where 𝑁𝑇 is the number of minutiae in the
template image 𝐹𝑇 , before performing random projection, it
is first processed by the feature decorrelation algorithm as
shown in Algorithm 1. This feature decorrelation algorithm
is useful because 𝑃(𝑚𝑖 ) only includes values of 1 and 0 and
has a sparse distribution, which might restrict the search
space if the random projection is directly implemented on
it. Furthermore, if 𝐶𝑇 is applied in multiple applications,
its feature correlation can be utilized by the adversary to
launch the ARM attack. For the above reasons, Algorithm 1
is proposed to eliminate feature correlation in different
applications.
It follows from Steps 1 and 2 in Algorithm 1 that the
new binary string P(𝑚𝑖 ), generated from the original feature
𝑃(𝑚𝑖 ), can be varied by simply adjusting the applicationspecific parameter 𝐿 𝐶 in different applications. Note that even
if one bit in P(𝑚𝑖 ) is changed, the output vector P(𝑚𝑖 ) will
be totally different due to the nature of the Discrete Fourier
Transform (DFT) in Step 3. Therefore, feature correlation
does not exist in the real-value vector P(𝑚𝑖 ) used in different
applications.
The modulo operation in Step 1 is a many-to-one mapping
and controlled by the parameter 𝐿 𝐶. Different 𝐿 𝐶 values may
lead to varying matching performance, which is discussed in
Case 3 of Section 4.1. Under the assumption that the random
projection based transformation is conquered, the modulo
operation might not be strong enough to safeguard 𝑃(𝑚𝑖 )
from the compromised P(𝑚𝑖 ) if 𝐿 𝐶 is set to be a large value.
For example, when 𝑙𝐶 = 34560 and 𝐿 𝐶 is set to be 20000,
for values of ‘1’ that appear in P(𝑚𝑖 ) from positions 1 to
14560, e.g., 123, its original position in 𝑃(𝑚𝑖 ) only has three
possible locations, either 123 or 20123 or both. To increase
security, we further propose Algorithm 2 as an enhancement
of Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 2 produces a binary code based segment
permutation before carrying out the steps in Algorithm 1.
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INPUT: the original feature 𝑃(𝑚𝑖 )
Process:
Step 1: 𝑃(𝑚𝑖 ) is divided into two parts, 𝑃1 and 𝑃2 ,
where 𝑃1 contains the first 𝐿 𝐶 elements of 𝑃(𝑚𝑖 ),
while 𝑃2 contains the remaining elements.
Step 2: 𝑃1 is evenly divided into 𝑁𝑆 segments, so
𝑃1 = {𝑆𝑗 }𝑁𝑠
𝑗∈1 and each segment 𝑆𝑗 is of length 𝐿 𝑆 = 𝐿 𝐶 /𝑁𝑆 .
Step 3: For each segment 𝑆𝑗 , calculate 𝜙𝑗 = 𝑠𝑢𝑚(𝑘 ∗ 𝑆𝑗 (𝑘)),
where 1 ≤ 𝑘 ≤ 𝐿 𝑆 . 𝜙𝑗 is a weighted sum of
position 𝑘 and its binary value for segment 𝑆𝑗 . Then
all the elements in 𝑆𝑗 are circularly shifted left by 𝜙𝑗
bits to generate a permutated segment 𝑆𝑗 .
Step 4: All the permutated segments {𝑆𝑗 }𝑁𝑠
𝑗∈1 are
concatenated into a new binary vector 𝑃1 , which is
further concatenated with 𝑃2 to create a binary vector
𝑃 (𝑚𝑖 ) = 𝑃1 ‖ 𝑃2
Step 5: Perform Steps 1 to 3 in Algorithm 1 with
input 𝑃 (𝑚𝑖 ).
OUTPUT: decorrelated feature P(𝑚𝑖 )
Algorithm 2: Enhanced feature decorrelation algorithm.

The segment permutation is guided by an on-the-fly binary
code 𝜙𝑗 = 𝑠𝑢𝑚(𝑘 ∗ 𝑆𝑗 (𝑘)), which is calculated using the
elements’ positions and values instead of a user specific key, so
its security does not suffer from the lost key attack. Moreover,
the binary code 𝜙𝑗 is calculated based on just 𝐿 𝑆 binary
elements in 𝑆𝑗 , which is only a portion of the original feature
𝑃(𝑚𝑖 ). This means that the error in one 𝜙𝑗 does not affect
the permutation of other segments of 𝑃(𝑚𝑖 ). The parameter
𝐿 𝑆 is the length of each segment, which impacts on the
matching performance and security strength. A larger value
of 𝐿 𝑆 means that it would require more computational effort
to invert 𝑆𝑗 to 𝑆𝑗 , but it would be more likely to cause errors
in 𝜙𝑗 , thus having a negative effect on matching accuracy.
The matching performance and security related to parameter
𝐿 𝑆 are discussed in Case 3 of Section 4.1 and Section 4.4,
respectively. We remark that Algorithm 2 offers an alternative
pathway for tighter security at the expense of performance,
as shown in Section 4.1 and that when 𝐿 𝑆 = 1, Algorithm 2
reverts to Algorithm 1.
The output vector P(𝑚𝑖 ) of Algorithm 1 or 2 is then
transformed by projecting onto a random space with the help
of the random projection matrix M of size 𝑋 × 𝑌, where
𝑋 = 𝐿 𝐶. The transformation of P(𝑚𝑖 ) using the random
matrix M can be compactly expressed by
𝑃̂ (𝑚𝑖 ) = P (𝑚𝑖 ) × M,

(1)

̂ 𝑖 ) is the inner product of P(𝑚𝑖 ) and M. The
where 𝑃(𝑚
above transformation makes the dimension of transformed
feature P(𝑚𝑖 ) reduced to Y so that the feature set P(𝑚𝑖 ) is
protected. Different values of Y affect the performance of the
proposed system, which is discussed in Section 4. Moreover,
revocability is achieved—a new template can be issued easily
by just changing the user specific key 𝑘𝑝𝑚 , which is analyzed
in Section 4. By applying Algorithm 1 or 2, and random

projection to each element of 𝐶𝑇 , 𝐶𝑇 can be transformed to
𝑇
̂𝑇 = {𝑃(𝑚
̂ 𝑖 )}𝑁 −1 .
be 𝐶
𝑖=0
3.1.2. The Delaunay Triangulation-Based Scheme. In the Delaunay triangulation-based scheme, the feature set 𝐷𝑇 , which
is a binary vector of length 𝑙𝐷, is transformed by permutation
guided by feature codes. Specifically, for each triangle, e.g.,
Δ𝑚1 𝑚2 𝑚3 , a feature code is calculated first. Some stable local
features can be used to obtain the feature code. These features
are defined as follows:
(i) 𝑜𝑚2 𝑚3 is the orientation differences between 𝑚2 and
𝑚3 .
(ii) 𝑙𝑚1 𝑚2 is the length of edge 𝑚1 𝑚2 .

(iii) 𝑙𝑚1 𝑚3 is the length of edge 𝑚1 𝑚3 .

(iv) 𝛼𝑚1 is the angle between edges 𝑚1 𝑚2 and 𝑚1 𝑚3 .

0 < 𝑜𝑚2 𝑚3 ≤ 2𝜋, 0 < 𝑙𝑚1 𝑚2 , 𝑙𝑚1 𝑚3 ≤ 300, and 0 < 𝛼𝑚1 ≤ 2𝜋.
Quantization is applied to each of these features to tolerate
small variation. Accordingly, a quantized four-element array
𝑞
𝑞
, 𝑙𝑞 , 𝑙𝑞 , 𝛼𝑚
] can be extracted from
𝑓𝑚𝑞 1 𝑚2 𝑚3 = [𝑜𝑚
1 𝑚2 𝑚1 𝑚2 𝑚1 𝑚3
1
triangle Δ𝑚1 𝑚2 𝑚3 which is further input into (2), based on
[52], to generate the feature code 𝑓𝑚𝑐 1 𝑚2 𝑚3 , which corresponds
to the triangle Δ𝑚1 𝑚2 𝑚3 , as follows:
𝑓𝑚𝑐 1 𝑚2 𝑚3 = Υ3 𝑓𝑚𝑞 1 𝑚2 𝑚3 (4) + Υ2 𝑓𝑚𝑞 1 𝑚2 𝑚3 (3)

(2)

+ Υ1 𝑓𝑚𝑞 1 𝑚2 𝑚3 (2) + Υ0 𝑓𝑚𝑞 1 𝑚2 𝑚3 (1) ,

where Υ = 𝑓(𝑓𝑚𝑞 1 𝑚2 𝑚3 (1), . . . , 𝑓𝑚𝑞 1 𝑚2 𝑚3 (4), Φ). Υ is the
output of function 𝑓(⋅) corresponding to inputs 𝑓𝑚𝑞 1 𝑚2 𝑚3 (1)
to 𝑓𝑚𝑞 1 𝑚2 𝑚3 (4) and a random parameter Φ. Φ is set to be
different in different applications, which enables Υ to be
𝑁𝑇

diverse. In this way, one set of feature codes {𝑓𝑖𝑐 }𝑖=11 are
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computed as such from 𝐹𝑇 , where 𝑁1𝑇 is the number of
Delaunay triangles in the template image 𝐹𝑇 . After the feature

Given a query image 𝐹𝑄 (letter 𝑄 means query), untransformed query feature sets 𝐶𝑄 and 𝐷𝑄 together with a set

code 𝑓𝑚𝑐 1 𝑚2 𝑚3 ∈ {𝑓𝑖𝑐 }𝑖=11 is obtained, the original bin to
which Δ𝑚1 𝑚2 𝑚3 is matched in 𝐷𝑇 , which is decided by
its corresponding integer value 𝑓𝑚𝑖𝑡1 𝑚2 𝑚3 , can be permutated
under the guidance of the feature code 𝑓𝑚𝑐 1 𝑚2 𝑚3 . So the new
bin becomes 𝑓𝑚𝑖𝑡1 𝑚2 𝑚3 +𝑓𝑚𝑐 1 𝑚2 𝑚3 . To increase the permutation
randomness, an extra key guided permutation could be added
on top of above permutation. By the same token, bins of
other Delaunay triangles can be shuffled to new locations

1
are extracted first, where 𝐶𝑄 =
of feature codes {𝑓𝑗𝑐 }𝑗=1

𝑁𝑇

𝑁𝑇

determined by their corresponding feature codes in {𝑓𝑖𝑐 }𝑖=11 .
The vector array 𝐷𝑇 , after permutation, is transformed into
𝑇
̂𝑇 . Since each feature code in {𝑓𝑐 }𝑁1 is
a new version 𝐷
𝑖 𝑖=1
generated from its corresponding Delaunay triangle feature
and not saved in the database or on the smart card, it is hard
to figure out the original bin location, even if the new bin
̂𝑇 .
position is acquired by the adversary from 𝐷
The reason why permutation is used to protect the feature
set 𝐷𝑇 rather than random projection, as in the case of the
feature set 𝐶𝑇 , is that permutation does not reduce feature
dimension, which can help minimize the impact on the
system’s matching performance. Moreover, feature code set
is not saved in the database or on the smart card, which
greatly improves the security of the original feature set 𝐷𝑇 .
Most importantly, noise in fingerprint images influences the
Delaunay triangulation only locally. Spurious or missing
minutiae affect only those local Delaunay structures which
contain them. Each Delaunay triangle is formed by only three
minutiae, which means that if a feature code, e.g., 𝑓𝑚𝑐 1 𝑚2 𝑚3 , is
incorrect, it only influences the permutated position of that
Delaunay triangle, from which the feature code is generated.
On the contrary, each polar coordinate-based structure is
composed of a reference minutia and a number of other
minutiae (usually more than ten minutiae) in a certain range.
Obviously, the chance of generating an incorrect feature
code from the polar coordinate-based structure is much
higher than that from the Delaunay triangle, which only
includes three minutiae. If we choose fewer minutiae from
the polar coordinate-based structure, say, only three minutiae
are chosen, which is the same number as that in the Delaunay
triangle, then how to correctly determine the three minutiae
from a query image and their corresponding minutiae from a
template image is a tricky issue, especially under the presence
of biometric uncertainty, e.g., spurious or missing minutiae.
Therefore, compared with permutation, random projection is
a better option for the protection of the feature set 𝐶𝑇 .
3.2. Verification Stage. In the verification stage, the same
projection matrix used in the enrollment stage is used to
transform the polar coordinate-based feature set extracted
from the query image, and the Delaunay triangulation-based
feature set can also be transformed under the guidance of the
feature codes. Finally, matching between the template image
𝐹𝑇 and query image 𝐹𝑄 is conducted using the transformed
features in the transformed domain. The detailed steps of the
verification stage are explained below.

𝑁𝑄

𝑄

𝑁 −1
{𝑃(𝑚𝑖 )}𝑖=0
, 𝑁𝑄 is number of minutiae, and 𝑁1𝑄 is the
number of Delaunay triangles in the query image 𝐹𝑄.
In the polar coordinate-based scheme, suppose that
𝑃̂𝑄(𝑚𝑗 ) denotes the 𝑗th transformed local feature of the
query and 𝑃̂𝑇 (𝑚𝑖 ) denotes the 𝑖th transformed local feature
of the template. Then the similarity score between them is
calculated by


 ̂𝑇
𝑃 (𝑚𝑖 ) − 𝑃̂𝑄 (𝑚𝑗 )
2 ,
𝑆𝐶 = 1 −  
 

𝑃̂𝑇 (𝑚𝑖 ) + 𝑃̂𝑄 (𝑚𝑗 )
2 
2


(3)

where ‖ ⋅ ‖2 denotes the 2-norm. Each polar coordinatebased local feature in the query is compared with each polar
coordinate-based local feature in the template to output a
similarity score. Upon the completion of the comparison,
there will be a score matrix of size 𝑁𝑇 × 𝑁𝑄. The maximum
value 𝑆𝐶max in this score matrix is considered to be the
matching score of the first feature set between the template
and query images.
In the Delaunay triangulation-based scheme, the set
𝐷𝑄 of the query is permuted under the guidance of the
̂𝑄. The
feature codes to generate the transformed version 𝐷
permutation procedure is the same as that in the enrollment
̂𝑄 and 𝐷
̂𝑇 can be
stage. The similarity score between 𝐷
calculated as
𝑙

𝑆𝐷 =

𝐷
̂𝑄) (𝐷
̂𝑇 )
̂𝑄,𝑘 − 𝐷
̂𝑇,𝑘 − 𝐷
∑2𝑘=1 (𝐷
𝑙𝐷
√ ∑2𝑘=1

2

̂𝑄)
̂𝑄,𝑘 − 𝐷
(𝐷

𝑙𝐷
∑2𝑘=1

̂𝑇 )
̂𝑇,𝑘 − 𝐷
(𝐷

2

,

(4)

̂ represents the mean value.
where 𝐷
The final score between the template image 𝐹𝑇 and query
image 𝐹𝑄 is calculated using both 𝑆𝐶max and 𝑆𝐷 from the polar
coordinate-based scheme and the Delaunay triangulationbased scheme, respectively, that is,
𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 = 𝜌𝐶 × 𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚 (𝑆𝐶max ) + (1 − 𝜌𝐶)
× 𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚 (𝑆𝐷) ,

(5)

where 𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚(⋅) is a score normalization function; 𝜌𝐶 is the
weight of score 𝑆𝐶max , which is set to be 0.7 in our application
so as to give more relevance to the use of our basic scheme, the
polar coordinate-based scheme. If the final matching score
𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 is larger than a predefined threshold 𝑆𝑡 , then the
template image 𝐹𝑇 and query image 𝐹𝑄 are considered to be
matching.

4. Experimental Results and Security Analysis
Three databases (DB1, DB2, and DB3) of FVC2002 and
one database (DB2) of FVC2004 were used to evaluate the
proposed fingerprint cancelable template design. Detailed
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Table 1: Detailed information about the databases used in our experiments.

Parameter
Resolution
Number of fingers
Number of images per finger
Sensor Type
Image size
Image quality

2002DB1
500 dpi
100
8
Optical Sensor
388 × 374
Medium

information about these four databases is listed in Table 1.
To extract minutiae from fingerprint images, a software
package called VeriFinger 4.0 from Neurotechnology [53]
was utilized.
The performance of the proposed fingerprint cancelable
template is evaluated by four performance indices, namely,
genuine acceptance rate (GAR), false acceptance rate (FAR),
false rejection rate (FRR), and equal error rate (EER). GAR
is defined as the ratio of successful genuine tests to the
total number of genuine tests. FAR is defined as the ratio
of successful imposter tests to the total number of imposter
tests, FRR (=1-GAR) is defined as the ratio of failed genuine
tests to the total number of genuine tests, and EER is defined
as the error rate when FRR and FAR are the same. For all
the databases, the 1VS1 matching protocol and standard FVC
matching protocol [42] were utilized in the experiments. In
the 1VS1 matching protocol, the first two images of each finger
were chosen for testing, while, in the FVC matching protocol,
all eight images of each finger were used.
4.1. Performance of the Proposed System under the Lost Key
Attack. The lost key attack was tested in the experiments by
allocating the same key 𝑘𝑝𝑚 to all the genuine and imposter
tests. Three different cases were evaluated as follows.
Case 1 (performance of the system under two different
instances). The performance of the system under three different instances is compared:
(i) Instance 1: using only the basic polar coordinatebased scheme
(ii) Instance 2: using only the Delaunay triangulationbased scheme
(iii) Instance 3: combining the polar coordinate-based
scheme and Delaunay triangulation-based scheme
The polar coordinate-based scheme in both instances 1
and 3 uses Algorithm 1 and the same parameter settings
𝐿 𝐶 = 20000. The comparison between Instances 1, 2, and 3
is conducted over the database FVC2002 DB2 using the 1VS1
matching protocol. ROC curves are drawn in Figure 5. It can
be observed from Figure 5 that Instance 3 (EER = 0.64%)
performs better than Instance 1 (EER = 1.00%) and Instance
2 (EER = 2.00%), which only uses the single structure under
the same parameter setting (𝑌 = 300).
Case 2 (performance of the proposed system using the
untransformed feature sets and the transformed feature sets).

2002DB2
569 dpi
100
8
Optical Sensor
560 × 296
Medium

2002DB3
500 dpi
100
8
Capacitive Sensor
300 × 300
Low

2004DB2
500 dpi
100
8
Optical Sensor
328 × 364
Very low

Figure 5: Performance of Instance 1 (the polar coordinate-based
scheme only), Instance 2 (the Delaunay triangulation-based scheme
only), and Instance 3 (both the polar coordinate-based scheme and
Delaunay triangulation-based scheme).

Performance of the proposed system that uses the untransformed feature sets and the transformed feature sets was
tested to evaluate the effect of feature transformation using
Algorithm 1 and parameter settings 𝐿 𝐶 = 20000. This test was
conducted on two databases, FVC2002 DB2 and DB3 with
the 1VS1 matching protocol. For database DB2, we obtained
EER = 0.62% using the untransformed feature sets and EER =
0.64% using the transformed feature sets. For database DB3,
EER = 4% was obtained using the untransformed feature sets,
while EER = 4.57% was obtained with the transformed feature
sets. In this case, matching performance becomes worse than
that before feature transformation.
Case 3 (effect of different parameter settings on the performance of the proposed system). The different parameter
settings of 𝐿 𝐶 and 𝐿 𝑆 in Algorithms 1 and 2 result in a
trade-off between security and matching performance [54].
Here, we investigate the effect of different parameter settings
of 𝐿 𝐶 and 𝐿 𝑆 on the system’s matching performance over
databases FVC2002 DB2 and DB3 using the 1VS1 matching
protocol. As shown in Table 2, choosing a smaller value of
𝐿 𝐶 in Algorithm 1 makes matching performance worse. This
is because the modulo operation in Algorithm 1 is a manyto-one mapping and smaller 𝐿 𝐶 increases the possibility of
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Table 2: EER (%) of the proposed system using different parameter settings in Algorithms 1 and 2.
Using Algorithm 1
𝐿𝐶
FVC2002 DB2
FVC2002 DB3

20000
0.64
4.57

𝐿𝑆
FVC2002 DB2
FVC2002 DB3

50
3.37
14.00

multiple ‘1’s folded to the same position, leading to a decrease
in feature discriminative ability. Algorithm 2 is proposed to
increase the difficulty of obtaining the original feature vector.
Under the same setting of 𝐿 𝐶 = 20000, we can see from
Table 2 that a larger value of 𝐿 𝑆 reduces matching accuracy,
for example, on database FVC2002DB2, EER is 3.37% when
𝐿 𝑆 = 50, as opposed to EER is 1.00% when 𝐿 𝑆 = 5. Both
EERs are worse than EER = 0.64% when 𝐿 𝑆 = 1 (which
is equivalent to just using Algorithm 1) because the featuredependent segment permutation is controlled by the binary
code 𝜙𝑗 and larger 𝐿 𝑆 , which represents a longer portion of
the original feature vector, is more likely to make 𝜙𝑗 incorrect.
From the above analysis, we can see that smaller 𝐿 𝐶 or
larger 𝐿 𝑆 can decrease matching performance. However, such
a parameter setting makes the retrieval of the original feature
vector harder under the assumption that random projection
based transformation is conquered. Detailed security analysis
is discussed in Section 4.4.
We also evaluated the performance of the proposed
system using different values of Y over databases FVC2002
DB2 and DB3 with the 1VS1 matching protocol under the
parameter setting 𝐿 𝐶 = 20000 in Algorithm 1. Security of
the first feature set is provided by the random projection
matrix M which is of size 𝑋 × 𝑌, (𝑌 ≤ 𝑋). The feature
vector 𝑃(𝑚𝑖 ), extracted from the polar coordinate-base d
structure, is transformed using Algorithm 1 and (1). The
smaller the value of Y is set, the more the dimensions are
reduced. A lower-dimensional transformed feature vector is
more secure as less information of the original feature vector
is kept. In the tests, we set the value of Y to be 300 and
50, respectively. The EER performance is listed in Table 3. It
can be observed that the smaller the value of Y, the higher
the EER. This is because less information about the original
features is preserved with more dimension cut (smaller Y),
leading to performance degradation. Moreover, under the
same parameter setting (𝑌 = 300), the proposed system
demonstrates better performance on database FVC2002 DB2
with EER = 0.64% than the performance on FVC2002 DB3
with EER = 4.57%. The main reason for this is the vast
difference of image quality between these two databases. The
first two images from database FVC2002 DB2 have much
better quality than the first two images of FVC2002 DB3
[10, 11].
4.2. Performance Comparison with the Similar Work. In this
section, we compare the performance of the proposed system

500
1.00
6.00
Using Algorithm 2 and 𝐿 𝐶 = 20000
5
1.00
8.07

1
0.64
4.57

Table 3: EER (%) of proposed system using different values of 𝑌.
𝑌
FVC2002 DB2
FVC2002 DB3

300
0.64
4.57

50
1.00
8.00

with other similar systems. The EER comparison under the
lost key scenario is reported in Table 4. It can be observed
that the proposed method outperforms all the existing similar
methods under the 1VS1 matching protocol. Under the FVC
matching protocol, the performance of proposed method is
worse than that of original 2P-MCC64,64 ; however, 2P-MCC
suffers from the ARM, as analyzed in Section 1.1. By contrast,
the proposed scheme is resilient to this attack. In [8] transformation parameters are derived directly from biometrics
via quantization, causing them rarely to be identical for the
same user when large minutia variance exists in fingerprint
images, which leads to poor performance. The structures in
[9–11] are constructed by each minutia with all other minutiae
in the image, resulting in more computational complexity. By
contrast, in the proposed method structures are only formed
by each minutia and its local neighbors in the range of 𝑅.
More importantly, the methods [7, 9–14] are vulnerable to the
ARM attack [47].
4.3. Revocability and Unlinkability. Revocability is an essential property that a qualified cancelable template design
should possess. Once a template is compromised, another
transformed template should be generated and the newly
generated template should be totally different from the
compromised template and suffer no performance degradation. To measure revocability of the proposed system,
we generated 50 different templates from the 1st image of
each finger by 50 different user specific keys. Then the
transformed templates were matched against the original
ones. The imposter distribution (with different keys) and
pseudo-imposter distribution on database FVC2002 DB2
are shown in Figure 6. It can be seen that the imposter
distribution and pseudo-imposter distribution are similar,
which means that even if multiple templates are generated
from the same image, they are distinct from the original
template and there is no performance degradation. The mean
and standard derivations of the imposter distribution are
0.2457 and 0.0408, respectively, while the values of these two
indicators of the pseudo-imposter distribution are 0.2419 and
0.0042, respectively.
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Table 4: EER (%) comparison between the proposed system and similar systems under the lost-key scenario.

Methods
Yang et al. [5]
Ahn et al. [6]
Yang and Busch [7]
Yang et al. [8]
Ahmad et al.[9]
Wang and Hu [10]
Wang and Hu [11]
Wang and Hu [12]
Jin et al. [13]
Jin et al.[14]
Ferrara et al. [15] 2P-MCC64,64
Instance 3 (proposed system)

1VS1
5.93
9
3.50
2
1
3.07
4.36
0.32

2002 DB1
FVC
7.18
3.30
5.75

2002 DB2
1VS1
FVC
4
3.61
13
0.85
6
4
5
2.30
3
2
1.02
1.77
1.80
0.64
4.71

Figure 6: Imposter (with different keys) and pseudo-imposter
distributions on FVC2002 DB2 when 𝑌 = 300.

To protect users’ privacy, unlinkability is another essential
property of cancelable fingerprint templates. It requires that
the transformed templates generated from the same finger
using different keys should be different to one another, as
if they were transformed from different fingers. In this way,
templates from the same individual used in different applications cannot be cross-matched. To verify the unlinkability
property of the proposed method, two indicators [55], the
false cross-match rate (FCMR) and the false non-cross-match
rate (FNCMR), are used in two cases over database FVC2002
DB2. Case 1: FNCMR is the ratio of unsuccessful matching
attempts between the transformed templates of the first and
second images of each finger. Feature transformation is based
on different keys. Case 2: FCMR is the ratio of successful
matching attempts between the transformed templates of
the first image from each finger and the first image of
different fingers. The FCMR and FNCMR curves are shown
in Figure 7, from which it is clear that 𝐹𝐶𝑀𝑅 + 𝐹𝑁𝐶𝑀𝑅 ≈

2002 DB3
1VS1
FVC
11.80
27
7.5
6.12
5.20
7.80
4.57
10.22

2004 DB2
1VS1
FVC
13.30
21.82
9.90
12.00

Figure 7: FCMR versus FNCMR tested on FVC2002 DB2 when 𝑌 =
300.

1, which conforms to the expected behavior of a crosscomparator [55].
4.4. Security Analysis. Given a template image 𝐹𝑇 , we obtain
feature sets 𝐶𝑇 and 𝐷𝑇 from the polar coordinate-based
and Delaunay triangulation-based structures. The polar
𝑁𝑇 −1
coordinate-based feature set 𝐶𝑇 = {𝑃(𝑚𝑖 )}𝑖=0
is protected by algorithms included in the polar coordinate-based
scheme. Specifically, each element 𝑃(𝑚𝑖 ) in 𝐶𝑇 first goes
through the proposed feature decorrection algorithm, Algorithm 1 or 2, which transforms it into another format P(𝑚𝑖 ),
making the transformed feature sets uncorrelated in different
applications, governed by application-specific parameters, 𝐿 𝐶
and 𝐿 𝑆 . Since the DFT is invertible, P(𝑚𝑖 ) is further protected
by random projection through the projection matrix M, as
shown in (1), which is essentially a many-to-one mapping.
M is of size 𝑋 × 𝑌 and 𝑌 is set to be smaller than X.
̂ 𝑖 ) has a reduced
Hence, the transformed feature vector 𝑃(𝑚
dimension compared with P(𝑚𝑖 ). The adversary can only
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㷠㷠㷠㷠㷠㷠㷠㷠㷠㷠㷠㷠㷠㷠㷠⏞ Step3:DFT
1 (mi )=[0, 0, 1, . . . , 0, 0, 1]

P1 (mi )
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P
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⏞㷠㷠㷠㷠㷠㷠㷠㷠㷠㷠㷠㷠㷠㷠㷠㷠㷠㷠
㷠㷠㷠㷠㷠㷠㷠㷠㷠㷠㷠㷠㷠㷠㷠⏞
P(mi )=[0, 1, 1, . . . , 0, 0, 1]

Application 2
Steps 1&2: folding

l

2
⏞㷠㷠㷠㷠㷠㷠㷠㷠㷠㷠㷠㷠㷠㷠㷠㷠㷠㷠
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2 (mi )=[1, 1, 0, . . . , 0, 1, 1]

P2 (mi )

×ℳ2

2 (mi )
P

Part A: Algorithm 1

Figure 8: An example of the proposed feature transformation method for the first feature set under the scenario of ARM.

launch the ARM attack by obtaining multiple transformation
matrices and transformed feature sets from the same original
feature set. Thanks to the feature decorrelation algorithm,
Algorithm 1 or 2, the ARM attack can be defended by the
proposed method, because the transformed feature set P(𝑚𝑖 )
is uncorrelated in different applications, which is achieved
by varying the application-specific parameters, 𝐿 𝐶 and
𝐿 𝑆.
Here we give an example to demonstrate how the proposed method defends the ARM. The whole transformation
process is divided into two parts: A and B, as shown in
Figure 8. Part A represents the procedure of Algorithm 1
and Part B represents the random projection based transformation. In Part A, with the original feature vector 𝑃(𝑚𝑖 ) of
length 𝑙𝐶, which only contains values of 0 and 1, under the
ARM scenario, we assume that the same 𝑃(𝑚𝑖 ) is used in
two applications. Without loss of generality, 𝐿 𝐶1 is chosen for
Application 1 and 𝐿 𝐶2 for Application 2, where 𝐿 𝐶1 ≠ 𝐿 𝐶2 .
The folding function in Algorithm 1 is expected to change
the input bit stream, yielding two different binary strings
for Applications 1 and 2, respectively. The purpose of the
DFT (Step 3 in Algorithm 1) is to convert the two new
(folded) binary strings into different real-value vectors, i.e.,
P1 (𝑚𝑖 ) for Application 1 and P2 (𝑚𝑖 ) for Application 2. In Part
B, the feature vectors P1 (𝑚𝑖 ) and P2 (𝑚𝑖 ) are, respectively,
transformed into 𝑃̂1 (𝑚𝑖 ) and 𝑃̂2 (𝑚𝑖 ) by random projection.
Due to the absence of correlation between P1 (𝑚𝑖 ) and
P2 (𝑚𝑖 ), even if the adversary acquires the transformed feature
vectors 𝑃̂1 (𝑚𝑖 ) and 𝑃̂2 (𝑚𝑖 ) as well as the projection matrices
M1 and M2 , he/she cannot launch the ARM to obtain
either P1 (𝑚𝑖 ) or P2 (𝑚𝑖 ), because it would be impossible
for the ARM to find sufficient number of relevant systems
equations matching the number of independent unknown
variables.
It is worth noting that the outputs, P1 (𝑚𝑖 ) and P2 (𝑚𝑖 ), of
Part A are the inputs to Part B as shown in the overlapped
area of Part A and Part B in Figure 8. P1 (𝑚𝑖 ) and P2 (𝑚𝑖 )
are intermediate products, which are not stored in the

database or on the smart card, because only the resultant
feature vectors 𝑃̂1 (𝑚𝑖 ) and 𝑃̂2 (𝑚𝑖 ) are needed for similarity
score calculation. Therefore, the adversary does not know
P1 (𝑚𝑖 ) and P2 (𝑚𝑖 ) unless he/she can recover them. One may
argue that if the random projection based transformation
(or Part B) is conquered, then P(𝑚𝑖 ) can be retrieved.
We now show why this is computationally infeasible. The
random projection based transformation in (1) effectively
constitutes an underdetermined system of linear equations.
Since the projection matrix M is of size 𝑋 × 𝑌 with Y
being smaller than X, rank(M) is no greater than 𝑌, which
is less than the number of unknowns, namely, elements
of P(𝑚𝑖 ). It is a well-known result in linear algebra [56]
that when the coefficient and augmented matrices of (1)
have the same rank, (1) has an infinite number of solutions.
Clearly, P(𝑚𝑖 ) is just one solution among so many solutions,
making the search for P(𝑚𝑖 ) tremendously hard, especially
with P(𝑚𝑖 ) having a relatively flat spectrum due to the
DFT.
Let us analyze the security provided by Algorithms 1 and
2, under the assumption that P(𝑚𝑖 ) is obtained by adversary.
The DFT in Algorithm 1 is invertible and not meant to protect
P(𝑚𝑖 ). The DFT is applied for the purpose of rendering a
dense data representation of the frequency samples of P(𝑚𝑖 )
so that the search space for P(𝑚𝑖 ) cannot be narrowed down
[57]. The modulo operation in Algorithm 1 can provide certain protection to the original feature vector 𝑃(𝑚𝑖 ) depending
on parameter settings. With an element of value ‘1’ found
at position 𝑓𝑃 in P(𝑚𝑖 ), where 𝑓𝑃 < 𝐿 𝐶, the number of
positions in 𝑃(𝑚𝑖 ) that could yield the value of ‘1’ at position
𝑓𝑃 in P(𝑚𝑖 ) is 𝑁𝑝 = ⌈𝑙𝐶/𝐿 𝐶⌉. The number of possibilities
that could result in the value of ‘1’ at position 𝑓𝑃 in P(𝑚𝑖 )
𝑁𝑝
𝑘
𝑘
𝐶𝑁
in theory, where 𝐶𝑁
means choosing 𝑘 from
is ∑𝑘=1
𝑝
𝑝
𝑁𝑝 positions, but, in reality, it is unlikely that a majority
of these 𝑁𝑝 positions in 𝑃(𝑚𝑖 ) contain ‘1’. Without loss of
generality, we assume that at most two of these 𝑁𝑝 positions
are ‘1’ for the rest of our discussions unless stated otherwise;
1
2
+ 𝐶𝑁
)
then the computational complexity is 𝑆𝑒 = log2 (𝐶𝑁
𝑝
𝑝
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bits in order to search all the possible combinations by brute
force attack. Suppose that there are 𝑁𝑒 ‘1’s in P(𝑚𝑖 ); then the
computational complexity for brute force search will be 𝑁𝑒 ×
𝑆𝑒 . When 𝑁𝑒 = 30, under the parameter settings 𝑙𝐶 = 34560
and 𝐿 𝐶 = 500, 𝑁𝑝 = ⌈34560/500⌉ = 70, the computational
1
2
complexity is 30 × log2 (𝐶70
+ 𝐶70
) ≈330 bits. However, if 𝐿 𝐶 is
set to be a large value, e.g., 𝐿 𝐶 = 20000, for elements of value
‘1’ found in P(𝑚𝑖 ) from positions 1 to 14560, say for value
‘1’ found at position 123, its original position in 𝑃(𝑚𝑖 ) only
has three possibilities, either position 123 or position 20123
or both. In this case, the number of possibilities provided by
the modulo operation is considerably reduced. To strengthen
the security of Algorithm 1 for the case that 𝐿 𝐶 is set to be
a large value, e.g., 20000, we propose Algorithm 2 on top of
Algorithm 1.
In Algorithm 2, the first part 𝑃1 of original feature vector
𝑃(𝑚𝑖 ) is first divided into 𝑁𝑆 segments and each segment,
e.g., 𝑆𝑗 , is permutated by a segment-based binary code, e.g.,
𝜙𝑗 . Take the segment 𝑆𝑗 of length 𝐿 𝑆 as an example. For
convenience, trivial segments containing full ‘0’s or full ‘1’s
are excluded in the following discussion as permutation does
not change the segment bit distribution. For a permuted
segment 𝑆𝑗 , there exists 𝐿 𝑆 − 1 number of different segments
originating from 𝑆𝑗 through the circular shift permutation.
One-bit difference in one segment implies a different entire
feature vector 𝑃1 which contains 𝑁𝑆 segments. The computational effort to determine all possible 𝑃1 due to the circular
shift permutation will be (𝐿 𝑆 − 1)𝑁𝑆 under the brute force
attack. Assume there are 𝑁𝑐 < 𝑁𝑆 nontrivial segments that
contain both zero and nonzero elements, then the actual
computational complexity reduces to be (𝐿 𝑆 − 1)𝑁𝑐 under the
brute force attack. Take, for example, 𝐿 𝑆 = 5 and 𝑁𝑐 = 60,
which has been observed in many of our experiments. In this
case, the number of security bits imposed by Algorithm 2
is log2 ((5 − 1)60 ) = 120 bits, which is a substantial amount.
Clearly, the added security from Algorithm 2 is at the expense
of matching performance, as shown in Section 4.1, which
reflects the fact that there is always a compromise between
security and recognition accuracy. Note that, for a given
permuted segment, it is hard to tell whether it is produced
by an actual permutation or it has not been permuted at all.
Therefore 𝐿 𝑆 instead of 𝐿 𝑆 − 1 can be used to account for
all possible shift combinations which can help increase the
security strength.
Regarding the security of the second feature set 𝐷𝑇 , since
̂𝑇 is obtained from 𝐷𝑇 under the guidance
the feature 𝐷
𝑁𝑇

of feature codes {𝑓𝑖𝑐 }𝑖=11 , which are generated from their
corresponding triangle feature and not saved in the database
or on the smart card, the adversary has no idea about the
̂𝑇 is hacked.
original location of a triangle feature, even if 𝐷
Under this situation, the adversary may try to guess the
feature code through the brute force attack. The number of
security bits for calculating one feature code, e.g., 𝑓𝑚𝑐 1 𝑚2 𝑚3 ,
𝑞
𝑞
which is given by 𝑓𝑚𝑞 1 𝑚2 𝑚3 = [𝑜𝑚
, 𝑙𝑞 , 𝑙𝑞 , 𝛼𝑚
] through
1 𝑚2 𝑚1 𝑚2 𝑚1 𝑚3
1
(2), can be expressed by 𝐻(Δ) = log2 ((2𝜋/𝑠𝑜 ) × (300/𝑠𝑙 )2 ×
(𝜋/𝑠𝛼 )) because the minutiae orientation range is [0, 2𝜋), the
edge length is (0, 300], and the range of an angle is (0, 𝜋).

In the experiments, the quantization steps for calculating the
feature code were set to be 𝑠𝑜 = 5𝜋/36, 𝑠𝑙 = 25 pixels and 𝑠𝛼 =
5𝜋/36 on database FVC2002 DB2. With these quantization
settings, the number of security bits 𝐻(Δ) is about 14 bits
for one feature code. However, this feature code can only
be used to find the original location of one triangle in 𝐷𝑇
and the adversary cannot verify the correction of the original
position. To exactly restore 𝐷𝑇 , the original locations of 𝑁1𝑇
triangles have to be determined at the same time, which
means that the security of 𝐷𝑇 is 𝑁1𝑇 × 14 bits. The average
value of 𝑁1𝑇 is 32 on database FVC2002 DB2. Since a certain
degree of error tolerance is allowed in the matching process,
the real security is lower than 𝑁1𝑇 × 14 bits, depending on the
matching score threshold 𝑆𝑡 . Note that, even if 𝐷𝑇 is revealed,
the original location of minutiae in the fingerprint image
remains unavailable, because 𝐷𝑇 only contains the relative
information of the three minutiae forming the Delaunay
triangle rather than the absolute coordinates on the image.
This means that compromising 𝐷𝑇 would not threaten the
security of 𝐶𝑇 .
Some other issues are discussed here: (1) In our application, polar coordinate-based local structures are employed.
Assume that 𝑚𝑖 and 𝑚𝑗 are two neighbor minutiae and
are considered as the origin of the polar coordinate of two
polar coordinate-based local structures 𝑆𝑚𝑖 and 𝑆𝑚𝑗 . Since
𝑚𝑖 and 𝑚𝑗 are neighbor minutiae, some of the minutiae
points included in local structure 𝑆𝑚𝑖 are also included in 𝑆𝑚𝑗 .
The feature vectors, e.g., 𝑃(𝑚𝑖 ) and 𝑃(𝑚𝑗 ), extracted from
local structures, 𝑆𝑚𝑖 and 𝑆𝑚𝑗 , respectively, may have some
correlation; however, they are different. Here ‘correlation’
indicates the existence of some common minutiae in different
polar coordinate-based structures, but it does not mean
that the features extracted from different polar coordinatebased structures are the same, because the features extracted
from different polar coordinate-based structures are based
on different reference minutiae and the information of the
reference minutiae is nonpublic. For instance, according to
Section 2.1, the positions of ‘1’ in 𝑃(𝑚𝑖 ) and 𝑃(𝑚𝑗 ) are decided
by the triplet values (𝜌𝑖𝑗 , 𝛼𝑖𝑗 , 𝛽𝑖𝑗 ) and (𝜌𝑗𝑖 , 𝛼𝑗𝑖 , 𝛽𝑗𝑖 ). The radial
distance 𝜌𝑖𝑗 is equal to 𝜌𝑗𝑖 , but 𝛼𝑖𝑗 and 𝛽𝑖𝑗 are different
from 𝛼𝑗𝑖 and 𝛽𝑗𝑖 , respectively. A moderate variation on the
orientation or/and its related line angle can change the values
of (𝜌𝑖𝑗 , 𝛼𝑖𝑗 , 𝛽𝑖𝑗 ) or (𝜌𝑗𝑖 , 𝛼𝑗𝑖 , 𝛽𝑗𝑖 ). So even if minutiae 𝑚𝑖 and
𝑚𝑗 are neighbor minutiae, the triplet values (𝜌𝑖𝑗 , 𝛼𝑖𝑗 , 𝛽𝑖𝑗 ) are
different from (𝜌𝑗𝑖 , 𝛼𝑗𝑖 , 𝛽𝑗𝑖 ), which leads to different feature
vectors 𝑃(𝑚𝑖 ) and 𝑃(𝑚𝑗 ). As the radial distance 𝜌𝑖𝑗 is equal to
𝜌𝑗𝑖 , so 𝑃(𝑚𝑖 ) and 𝑃(𝑚𝑗 ) may have some correlation that can
be utilized by the adversary. However, any correlation based
attack needs at least a compromised feature vector, e.g., 𝑃(𝑚𝑖 )
or 𝑃(𝑚𝑗 ), as a base, which unfortunately is infeasible because
𝑃(𝑚𝑖 ) or 𝑃(𝑚𝑗 ) has been decorrelated and protected by the
folding, permutation, and random projection. (2) Assume
the number of ‘1’s, in feature vector 𝑃(𝑚𝑖 ), is 𝑁1𝑠 . According
to our statistics on the databases, 𝑁1𝑠 is 34, which is much
smaller than the length 𝑙𝐶 (e.g., 𝑙𝐶 = 34560) of the feature
vector 𝑃(𝑚𝑖 ). If these 𝑁1𝑠 ‘1’s are uniformly distributed on
34
𝑃(𝑚𝑖 ), the computation complexity is about log2 (𝐶34560
) =
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384 bits in order to correctly recover all the 34 ‘1’s in 𝑃(𝑚𝑖 )
by brute force attack. One may claim that these binary ‘1’s are
not uniformly distributed. We give an example here. Assume
that all the 34 ‘1’s are only located in the first 1000 bins out
of a total of 34560 bins of the feature vector 𝑃(𝑚𝑖 ). Although
this is a highly unlikely case, computational complexity for
34
this example is about log2 (𝐶1000
) = 210 bits under the brute
force attack, which demonstrates that the proposed method
is still secure enough. Actually, it is nearly impossible if
one can generate a binary string that is absolutely uniform.
Our statistics of the probability distribution of bit ‘1’ over
unfolded raw features, e.g., 𝑃(𝑚𝑖 ), shows that the features
are with a good degree of uniform distribution. For example,
the maximum probability of being ‘1’ of a bin is 10−4 , which
shows that dominant probability does not exist. Moreover,
even after removing bins with probability being ‘1’ that are
equal to or less than 20% of the maximum probability, the
remaining bins are still more than a thousand. The estimated
figures, e.g., 330, 120, and 384 bits, in our security analysis,
may be not tight. However, these could be the best analytical
results one can get unless an accurate distribution model can
be developed, which is far beyond the scope of this paper as
such distribution model can be a research topic by its own.
(3) There is a type of statistical attack, named Moore-Penrose
inverse [58], to find possible solutions of the linear system
(random projection is a linear system). If the linear system
𝑏 = 𝐴𝑥 has any solutions, they are given by 𝑥 = 𝐴+ 𝑏,
where 𝐴+ is the Moore-Penrose inverse of 𝐴. It is well known
that a Moore-Penrose inverse based solution 𝑥 has the minimum Euclidean norm ‖𝑥 ‖2 . There is no theoretic basis for
any deterministic relationship between the Moore-Penrose
inverse based solution 𝑥 and the ground truth 𝑥, if 𝐴 is
random. Some probabilistic relationship might exist for some
cases, for example, based on the values of the Moore-Penrose
inverse based solution 𝑥 , one may estimate the position of ‘1’s
in binary vector in 𝑥 by general statistical relation that large
values in 𝑥 corresponding to ‘1’s in 𝑥. However, for a specific
application, the defender can select suitable random projection matrix, e.g., 𝐴, so that this statistical relation can be
lessened. We have experimentally verified that a solution 𝑥
that is based on the Moore-Penrose inverse incorporating the
statistical relation can find only one correct position of ‘1’ in
𝑥.
4.5. Suitability/Feasibility on Mobile Devices. In this section, the template size and computational complexity of
the proposed system are discussed. In our application, the
template consists of two parts. One is the transformed polar
𝑇
̂𝑇 = {𝑃(𝑚
̂ 𝑖 )}𝑁 −1 and the other
coordinate-based feature set 𝐶
𝑖=0
one is the transformed Delaunay triangulation-based feature
̂𝑇 . The size of each element 𝑃(𝑚
̂ 𝑖 ) in 𝐶
̂𝑇 depends on
set 𝐷
the parameter setting Y of the transformation matrix. If Y
̂ 𝑖 ) is 4.7 KB, and then the
is set to be 300, the size of 𝑃(𝑚
𝑇
̂
̂𝑇 is of size
size of 𝐶𝑇 is 4.7 × 𝑁 KB. The feature set 𝐷
𝑙𝐷 = 20000 bits ≈ 2.5KB. In terms of matching time, it takes
̂𝑇
about 0.000171 seconds to match an element 𝑃̂𝑇 (𝑚𝑖 ) from 𝐶
𝑄
̂𝑄. Assume that there are
against an element 𝑃̂ (𝑚𝑗 ) from 𝐶
𝑇
̂𝑇 and 𝑁𝑄 elements in
𝑁 elements in template feature set 𝐶
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̂𝑇
̂𝑄, then the matching time between 𝐶
query feature set 𝐶
𝑄
𝑇
̂𝑄 is 𝑁 × 𝑁 × 0.000171 seconds. The matching time
and 𝐶
̂𝑇 and 𝐷
̂𝑄 is about 0.00872 seconds.
between 𝐷
Take the fingerprint image 1 1.tif and image 1 2.tif in
FVC2002 DB2 for example. Assume that image 1 1.tif is
template image and 1 2.tif is the query image. The value of
𝑁𝑇 is 31 in the template, so the template size is 148.2 (=4.7 ×
31 + 2.5) KB. The value of 𝑁𝑄 is 33 in the query, so the
matching time between the template and query is 0.18263
(=31×33×0.00017+0.00872) seconds. The above experiment
is conducted using MATLAB on a laptop with Intel processor:
i5-2450M dual-core CPU of 2.50 GHz, 2.50 GHz, RAM
of 8GB, and Operation System of 64-bit Win 7. With the
powerful storage and computing capability of today’s mobile
devices, e.g., smartphones, the imposed storage size and
computational load are never an issue.

5. Conclusion
In this paper, a new fingerprint cancelable template system
has been proposed for mobile device authentication. The new
cancelable template can mitigate the negative impact of nonlinear distortion by combining multiple feature sets. Since the
proposed system with two feature sets contains more feature
information than most existing cancelable templates with just
a single feature set, the discriminative power of the proposed
system gets increased and thus recognition performance is
enhanced. Furthermore, the proposed method can defeat the
ARM attack through eliminating the feature correlation in
different applications, which is a clear advantage over those
existing cancelable templates that are vulnerable to the ARM
attack. In the future work, the proposed scheme will be
applied to other biometrics such as cancelable palmprint [59].
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